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INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL PROCEDURES 
IN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 
Ernest Gellhorn* and Paul B. Larsen** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
SINCE administrative hearings take many forms, agency rules of practice necessarily vary. One of the original justifications for 
creating administrative agencies was to promote the development 
of individual procedural responses to particular regulatory needs. 
Obviously, the procedures in an unfair labor practice case have little 
in common with those in utility rate proceedings. Hence, it would 
be counterproductive to straight-jacket the proceedings of one with 
the rules of the other. Nevertheless, comparable agency problems 
may lend themselves to a uniform response. Interlocutory appeal 
practices for reviewing a hearing examiner's interim rulings fall 
into this category.1 
The advantages of immediate agency review of an examiner's 
interlocutory rulings are manifold. It avoids the manifest waste of 
time and money that results from the parties being forced to await 
the examiner's initial decision and then having the challenged 
ruling, which was made at the outset of the proceeding, reversed. 
Even if a rehearing is not ordered, the cost of the unnecessary trial 
is obvious. Moreover, interlocutory review assures that trial rulings 
are correct. It affords examiners guidance on procedural questions 
when most needed--especially since procedural issues tend to be 
buried in the final appeal. In other words, an interlocutory appeal 
may satisfy the demands of fairness prior to the final appeal. 
However, the costs of interlocutory appeal may readily offset its 
gains. An interim appeal can either immediately delay the proceed-
ing or ultimately have a delaying effect. The appeal interrupts the 
proceeding, interferes with the examiner's control of the case, wastes 
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1. This study and its recommendations deal only with formal administrative 
adjudications or other trial-type proceedings presided over by a hearing examiner. 
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time and money if the only consequence of the appeal is to affirm 
the examiner's ruling, and distracts the review authority from more 
important policy functions. Even worse, a costly interlocutory appeal 
may be unnecessary if the challenged issue becomes moot or non-
prejudicial as a result of the initial decision. Not only might single 
appeals from the initial decision be more economical, but the review 
authority may also be unable to review interlocutory issues ade-
quately if the question is premature. 
There are, therefore, substantial arguments for and against per-
mitting interlocutory review of an examiner's rulings. With so even 
a balance in principle, factual analysis of agency practices becomes 
critical. This study measures agency practice against the standard 
that hearing procedures must be fair, and unnecessary delay is as 
unfair to the parties and the public as are arbitrary and erroneous 
interlocutory rulings. 
II. INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 
A. Scope and Methodology 
With these considerations in mind, we reviewed the interlocutory 
appeal case records and rules of six federal agencies. Of the 
major independent agencies, the study covered all except the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (ICC), which was omitted because it 
does not maintain separate interlocutory review records.2 The ICC's 
position is not as unusual as this comment might suggest. Even 
though interlocutory appeals are frequent in many agencies, only the 
Federal Communications Commission maintains summary statistics 
identifying the number of appeals, the delay (if any) that they cause, 
and the decisions of the revie-wing authority. Consequently, we had 
to develop most of the data reported here from the agencies' records. 
The data collected are not precisely comparable since the agencies' 
methods of maintaining their files and case records differ. Never-
theless, we were able to gather sufficient information to present a 
description of the operation of each agency's interlocutory review 
procedure. · 
This study covers agency performance during three fiscal years, 
beginning with 1968. In addition to examining each agency's rules of 
practice, we reviewed the records of those agency hearings presided 
2. After a brief sampling of the Interstate Commerce Commission's [hereinafter 
ICC] case records, we recognized that we could not obtain a worthwhile representative 
sampling of its massive caseload without inordinate effort-nor could we fill the 
information gap by conducting individual interviews or by making a selective review 
of the ICC's records, 
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over by a hearing examiner in ·which the examiner's ruling was sub-
jected to interlocutory review. Initially, we concentrated on basic 
statistics, such as the number of hearings, the frequency of inter-
locutory review, the delays caused, and the review authority's de-
cisions on appeal. The collection of follow-up data depended upon 
the pattern that the basic data disclosed. To these quantitative 
measures, we added qualitative impressions garnered from inter-
views with review authorities, hearing examiners, staff attorneys, and 
private practitioners. Our primary objective was to measure the 
impact of different procedures on interlocutory review. We recog-
nized, of course, that other variables (e.g., the type of hearing, the 
quality of agency personnel, the importance of the ultimate decision 
to the parties) have a bearing on each agency's performance. We 
identified these variables and sought to assess their individual im-
pact. 
B. Current Interlocutory Review Procedures 
and Their Impact 
I. Federal Communications Commission 
Trial-type hearings at the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) usually involve broadcast applications, renewals, or transfers. 
These are essentially licensing proceedings, with disputed issues aris-
ing when more than one applicant seeks the same license or when 
either the staff or another licensee objects or, as happens occasionally, 
when a representative of the community opposes the application.3 
However, many FCC hearings are almost indistinguishable from 
complaint cases. The latter are primarily disciplinary actions seeking 
to revoke a station's operating license. Here delay usually favors the 
challenged party since the license continues until the proceeding is 
concluded. 
Until November 1970, the FCC freely allowed interlocutory ap-
peals from examiner rulings through an intermediate appellate re-
view board.4 The Commission's experience with this liberal practice 
was remarkable. Hearings were not inordinately disrupted or de-
layed, nor was the time of agency members unnecessarily consumed. 
Nevertheless, FCC interlocutory appeals as a matter of right are now 
restricted to a few particularly sensitive questions and interlocutory 
review by the Review Board is primarily within the examiner's dis-
3. Federal Communications Commission [hereinafter FCC] examiners also preside 
over other types of rate and licensing hearings. 
4. For a careful analysis of the FCC's review board, see Freedman, Review Boards 
in the Administrative Process, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 546 (1969). 
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cretion. The Board also issues interlocutory rulings on questions 
beyond the examiner's authority. These rulings on direct petition, 
as well as the Board's rulings on appeal from interlocutory orders 
issued by examiners, are appealable to the Commission. Serious delay 
or disruption has not occurred under this revised procedure. 
During the three :fiscal years under study, the FCC's rules gov-
etning appeals from an examiner's intetlocutory rulings provided 
that "[a]ny party to a hearing proceeding n1ay :file an appeal from an 
adverse ruling ... [to] the Review Board."6 Review Board decisions 
were appealable to the Commission under the same standard. The 
only formal restriction imposed on interlocutory appeals appeared 
in a Commission note (appended to the rules) urging parties to defer 
appeals unless the ruling "is fundamental and affects the conduct of 
the entire case."6 Consequently, the failure to appeal would delay 
but not waive any objections except those objections that become 
moot if not pressed immediately. The rules made no provision for 
postponing the hearing pending the interlocutory appeal, although 
they did allow the presiding officer and the Review Board discretion 
to stay an order.7 As a matter of practice, examiners generally have 
not postponed hearings pending an interlocutory appeal. However, 
this result may have followed from the fact that discovery or post-
hearing questions constituted a significant portion of the FCC's inter-
locutory appeals and the hearings were not then in session. The FCC 
Review Board's time has been consumed more by direct petitions on 
interlocutory matters outside the examiners' province than by ap-
peals from examiner rulings. "[P]etitions to amend, modify, enlarge, 
or delete the issues in cases of adjudications" are for the Review 
Board and not the examiner.8 
The statistics on interlocutory appeals relating to the scope or 
conduct of adjudicatory hearings at the FCC during the three fiscal 
years studied are shown in Table I. These statistics require some ex• 
planation. On the one hand, the number of interlocutory rulings by 
examiners shown in Table I is inflated because it includes routine 
n1atters that are never appealed (e.g., the Chief Examiner's designa-
5. 47 C.F.R. § l.30l(a) (1970), as amended, FCC Report 8.: Order 70-1193 (1970), 47 
C.F.R. § l.30l(a) (1971). 
6. 47 C.F.R. § 1.301, Note (1970), as amended, FCC Report & Order 70-1193, 35 Fed. 
Reg. 17333 (1970). 
7. 47 C.F.R. § l.301(e) (1970), as amended, FCC Report 8.: Order 70-1193 (1970), 47 
C.F.R. § 1.30l(c) (1971). Cf. 47 C.F.R. § l.115(h) (1971). 
8. 47 C.F.R. § 1.2!H(a)(2) (1971). The Board acts on numerous other interlocutory 
matters (e.g., petitions to extend time, to reconsider, to correct the transcript) unre• 
lated to the conduct of the adjudicatory hearing before the examiner. Id. These rulings 
are not considered here. 
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TABLE 19 
!NTERLOCUTORY .APPEALS IN FCd :HEARINGS 
1968 
Interlocutory rulings by examiners 1856 
interlocutory appeals from examiner rulings 
(to Review Board) 41 
Direct interlocutory petitions (to Review Board) 179 
Interlocutory appeals to FCC 30 
Adjudications disposed of by hearing 131 
Adjudications pending at end of fiscal year 134 
Adjudications docketed 206 
113 
Fiscal Year 
1969 1970 
1690 1914 
26 48 
133 128 
33 23 
no 113 
147 168 
134 128 
tion of examiners). On the other hand, many controversial inter• 
locutory rulings issued by an examiner are not reflected because the 
ruling was not formalized or no interim appeal WciS songht (e.g., 
rulings to admit or reject evidence during a heating). Moreover, it 
is not true that every hearing involves at least one interlocutory inter• 
ruption (as might be concluded from this table), since there often 
is :tnore than one· appeal in a proceeding. 
Even when adjusted, the number of direct petitions and inter-
locutory appeals does not adequately reflect the actual sitnation. 
Direct petitions, of --which there are relatively many, seldom impede 
adjudicatory hearings. Hearings usually are not postponed pending 
the Board's decision, and most petitions (e.g., to add or amend issues 
to be determined) are filed shortly after the case is first assigned to 
the examiner; thus they seldom occasion serious delay. Although 
more apt to cause delay, interlocutory appeals from examiner rulings 
do not appear excessive. Of the 48 appeals filed in fiscal 1970, the 
Review· Board reversed the examiner in 20% of the cases. The 
benefits of these appeals appear substantial.10 The parties are assured 
a fairer hearing--one tried in accordance with the Commission's 
rules and policies. Moreover, the cost of these appeals does not seem 
very high. In over 90% of the FCC's hearings, ho delay or expense 
is incurred because no interlocutory appeal is filed.11 It has not been 
9. These statistics were supplied by the Review Board and the Chief Hearing 
Examiner, We have excluded~ven from "direct interlocutory petitions"-requests 
made directly to the Review Board that do not directly affect the adjudication (e.g., 
petitions for extensions of time on appeal to the Review Board, petitions to reopen 
the record, and petitions to reconsider the Board's decision). 
IO. See, e.g., Harrison Radio, Inc., 22 F.C.C.2d 283 (1970); Citizens Cable Co., 
19 F.C.C.2d 907 (1969); East St. Louis Broadcasting Co., 9 F.C.G.2d 212 (1967). 
ll. In connection with the November 1970 rule change, the chairman of the FCC 
Review Board made a detailed analysis of interlocutory appeals during the second 
half of fiscal 1970. While 22 appeals were processed by the Board, they involved only 
15 proceedings. During this time approximately 200 docket proceedihgs were :tssigned 
to the FCC's examiners. Thus, less than 8% of all adjudications assigned to examiners 
during this period were subject to interlocutory interference. 
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suggested that unsuccessful appeals are frivolous or undesirable; in-
deed, an affirmation of the examiner's decision may enhance his 
standing and performance. The delay resulting from an unsuccessful 
interlocutory appeal is unlikely to be significant since the hearing 
generally is not postponed and the Review Board usually decides 
the question within 60 days.12 Moreover, as the statistics demonstrate, 
the Commission seldom interferes with the Board's disposition of 
interlocutory questions.13 
Despite this successful record, the FCC did amend its rules of 
practice to restrict interlocutory review of examiner rulings. Except 
for sensitive orders rejecting claims of privilege, making confidential 
records available, or terminating a person's right to participate in a 
hearing, interlocutory appeals can now be heard by the Review 
Board only if allowed by the examiner.14 In the awkward phrasing 
of the FCC's rule, the examiner shall permit an appeal if it "presents 
an important question of law or policy as to which there is sub-
stantial ground for difference of opinion and . . . the ruling is such 
that error would be likely to require remand should the appeal be 
deferred and raised as an exception."15 Questions subject to discre-
tionary review can still be postponed and raised on a party's appeal 
from the examiner's initial decision.16 However, if the appeal exists 
as a matter of right, the issue is waived unless pressed immediately.17 
This rule amendment is curious in view of the FCC's experience 
with interlocutory review. If any problem existed, it was with dis-
covery appeals, which occasionally seemed unworthy of review,18 and 
with the procedure that allowed the parties to by-pass the examiner 
on many questions. The new rule, however, goes beyond appeals 
from discovery rulings, and it does not require that all interlocutory 
issues be considered first by the examiner. The FCC justifies the 
amendment on the grounds that it expedites hearings "by strength-
ening the position of the presiding officer, by cutting down on hear-
ing delays occasioned by consideration of appeals which should be 
deferred pending action on the merits, and by freeing the Review 
12. The average time between the filing of an interlocutory appeal and the Review 
Board's decision during 1968 was 54 days, during 1969, 54.5 days, and during 1970, 58.5 
days. 
13. During the eight-year history of the Review Board (Aug. I, 1962-June 30, 1970), 
the FCC granted only 36 petitions for review-and this figure includes several matters 
beyond the scope of what we have included in interlocutory review. 
14. 47 C.F.R. § 1.301 (1971). 
15. 47 C.F.R. § l.30l(b) (1971). 
16. 47 C.F.R. § l.30l(b)(l) (1971). 
17. 47 C.F.R. § l.30l(a) (1971). 
18. E.g., Chronicle Broadcasting Co., 23 F.C.C.2d 162 (1970). 
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Board to spend its resources" elsewhere.19 Staff proponents readily 
concede that the arguments for eliminating needless hearing delays 
and for reallocating Review Board resources are make-weights-as 
is indicated by the relatively trouble-free operation of the open ap-
peal procedure. The main justification, then, for sunendering the 
benefits of Board supervision (at least when the examiner refuses 
the appeal request) and restricting appeals much in the manner of 
the federal courts is to enhance the position, power, and prestige 
of the Commission's hearing officers. That there are some grounds 
for this rationale cannot be gainsaid. Although such evaluations are 
necessarily subjective, most observers concede that, as the FCC has 
granted additional authority to its examiners, their self-respect, pro-
fessional stature, and performance have improved. Whether the 
power to deny interlocutory appeals from most evidentiary and pro-
cedural rulings will further enhance the examiners' status is less 
clear. Currently, examiners are upheld in 80% of all interlocutory 
appeals.20 The effect of such approbation would appear to be sub-
stantial. Indeed, it is not clear that examiners would relinquish such 
approval by denying interlocutory requests. It is possible under the 
new discretionary review procedure for the examiner to certify only 
those rulings that he believes (and probably knows) will be upheld 
and to deny permission to appeal from questionable rulings that 
might be reversed. 
On the other hand, the record does not justify any assumption 
that examiners will use their new powers, either consciously or un-
consciously, in so deceptive a manner. Experience with the new rule 
will ultimately provide an answer. For the present, an educated 
guess suggests that the impact of the new rule will be minimal, 
especially since the parties retain the right to appeal or to by-pass 
the examiner on the most important interlocutory questions.21 This 
point was underscored by the Federal Communications Bar, which 
reluctantly supported the rule change after it was modified to ex-
pand the automatic review provisions for claims of privilege, because 
"in extraordinary circumstances involving obvious and serious error, 
parties could petition the Commission for waiver of thr [sic] 
rule .... "22 
19. FCC Report&: Order 70-1193, ,I 6, 35 Fed. Reg. 17333 (1970). 
20. During fiscal 1970, the Review Board reversed examiners on 9 out of 48 inter-
locutory appeals. 
21. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. 
22. FCC Preliminary Report &: Order 3 (submitted Oct. 7, 1970), on file with the 
Michigan Law Review. This justification, interestingly enough, was deleted from the 
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Despite this expansion of the examiner's authority, the FCC's 
rules are still overly restrictive. On the one hand, the examiner is 
not authorized to rule on all interlocutory questions once the matter 
is assigned to him despite the fact that he is most familiar with the 
case. His views should be obtained before the Review Board acts on 
the appeal. Moreover, a ruling by the examiner may avoid unneces-
sary appeals to the Review Board. On the other hand, if applied 
strictly, the new standard for determining whether an interlocutory 
appeal should be allowed may be unfair. The standard requires a 
three-step test: the issue must (a) involve an important question in 
the mind of the examiner, (b) be unresolved under Commission prec-
edent, and (c) result in prejudicial error if incorrectly decided.23 
The standard seemingly excludes equally important questions de-
serving Review Board consideration. For example, consider a ques-
tion that will become moot by the time the Review Board hearing is 
held (and thus remand is unlikely). Or consider rulings that, while 
not rising to the level of prejudicial error, are of substantial impor-
tance to the aggrieved party. We suspect that examiners are likely 
to certify these and other questions despite the rule language. If our 
estimate is accurate, practical accommodations would not forestall 
the rewriting of these awkward rules. 
2. Federal Power Commission 
Viewed superficially, Federal Power Commission (FPC) hearings 
appear similar to those of the FCC. Thus, it seems surprising that 
substantially fewer interlocutory appeals are filed at the FPC. In 
both agencies, hearings involve either license applications or rate 
requests. Each agency operates with approximately 15 examiners, 
whose decisions often determine the future positions of the par-
ticipating businesses. Yet the FPC holds fewer than half the number 
of hearings the FCC does.24 And the FPC seldom allows interlocutory 
appeals from examiner rulings, whereas, until last November, the 
FCC allowed appeals as a matter of right. 
The difference is not attributable to the personnel or to the rules 
of each agency, even though they differ. It lies, rather, in their basic 
work. Rate requests are the most frequently contested type of FPC 
FCC's final report even though the Commission discussed the Federal Communications 
Bar Association Committee's support in its order. 35 Fed. Reg. 17332-33 (1970). 
23. 47 C.F.R. § l.30l(b) (1971). 
24. See SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRAcrICE &: PROC., SENATE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 88th CONG., 2D SESS., STATlsnCAL DATA RE!.Atto 1'0 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEED• 
JNcs 27-30, 35-38 (Comm. Print 1964) (Part II of the "Statistical Greenbook"). 
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hearings-at least when measured by hearing days. These hearings 
tend to be complex, extended affairs concentrating on the economic 
condition of the parties and the industry and usually involve tech-
nical evidence. Little attention is paid to the personal histories of 
the company officers, and issues of credibility are rare. FPC hearings 
frequently involve expert evaluation, which makes it difficult for 
a reviewing authority to obtain an adequate grasp of the context in 
which the examiner issued his ruling without inordinate study of 
the record. Discovery is not significant in FPC practice and individual 
rulings are less likely to require remand or retrial of the entire case. 
In essence, the issues and evidence at FPC hearings discourage inter-
locutory review.25 
Eve;n though FPC hearings are not subject to significa;nt inter-
locutory appeal and the Commission keeps no statistics on interloc-
utory review, its rules are worth noting. Interlocutory appeals to the 
Commission are authorized only "in extraordinary circumstances 
where prompt decision by the Commission is necessary to prevent 
detriment to the public interest."26 The examiner determines whether 
"extraordinary circumstances" exist. 27 Certification by the examiner 
neither assures the appealing party that review will be granted nor 
substantially delays the proceeding since the interlocutory petition 
"shall be deemed to have been denied" unless the FPC acts upon it 
within 30 days.28 The FPC's protest rule, which allows anyone to 
file a protest "to alert the Commission and the parties to a proceeding 
of the fact and nature of the protestant's objection,1'29 can be used to 
seek direct interlocutory relief from the Commission if an examiner 
25. FCC hearings, on the contrary, usually present a different situation. Except 
for common carrier rate hearings (which are basically indistinguishable from Federal 
Power Commission· [hereinafter FPC] rate requests), most contested FCC hearings in-
volve competing applications for a broadcast license, even in renewal or revocation 
hearings, Only occasional attenpon is given to industry conditions or economic 
evidence in broadcast hearings, other than consideration of the soundness of the 
applicant's financial condition. Instead, the hearings concentrate on the applicant's 
past record or prospect and frequently include a review of individual actions over 
several years. That is, the evidence presented in most FCC hearings is less complex. 
and voluminous than that adduced before FPC examiners. 
26. 18 C.F.R. § 1.28(a) (1971). Until November 1968, this strict limitation was not 
applicable to appeals from an examiner's ruling at a preheating conference. FPC Order 
141, 12 Fed. Reg. 8480 (1947), as amended, FPC Order 217, 24 Fed. Reg. 9473 (1959). 
Tile FPC abolished this distinction, however, so that all interlocutory appeals are now 
subject to Rule l.28(a) without regard to whether the examiner's ruling was made 
during the-hearing-or at a preheating-conference. FPC Order 373, 33 Fed. Reg. 17174 
(1968). 
27. 18 C.F.R. § 1.28(a) (1971). 
28. l8 C,F.R. § l.28(c) (1971). 
29. 18 C.F.R. § 1.IO(b) (1971). 
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unreasonably refuses to certify a question. Direct appeals, however, 
are exceedingly rare. 
While FPC hearings may not provoke as many interlocutory ques-
tions as do the proceedings of other agencies, staff attorneys and prac-
titioners concede that questions of discovery or evidence can raise 
serious objections. The practice, however, is to rely upon the appeals 
from the examiner's final decision to present any objections that 
might have been raised on interlocutory review. The FPC Bar, which 
assisted in drafting the FPC rules, is a relatively small group; 
thus most practitioners appearing before an examiner have, or expect 
to have, other cases before the Commission. Consequently, it is diffi-
cult to penetrate the resulting consensus toward postponing appeals. 
It appeared to us that FPC examiners and the FPC Bar have reached 
a practical (if unacknowledged) accommodation on the procedures 
for deciding interlocutory questions. 
3. Civil Aeronautics Board 
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) hearings fall primarily into two 
areas, licensing (route applications) and rate-making (tariff filings). 
Board proceedings are often lengthy and complex. Economic evi-
dence is predominant and voluminous. Hence, CAB hearings parallel 
FPC proceedings, with the exception that the topics differ. The 
former relate solely to air transportation, while the latter regulate 
the supply of electric and gas energy. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the CAB's procedure for interlocutory review of examiner rul-
ings is similar to the FPC's approach. The only significant difference 
between the two is that, although the FPC still hears an occasional 
appeal, the CAB, as a matter of practice, hears none. 
While the CAB's rules continue to authorize interlocutory re-
view, they do so only "in extraordinary circumstances and with the 
consent of the examiner."30 Even then the appeal will be disallowed 
unless the examiner finds that interlocutory review "is necessary to 
prevent substantial detriment to the public interest or undue prej-
udice to any party."31 Not surprisingly, examiners do not find that 
their challenged rulings will cause substantial detriment to the 
public or will unduly prejudice one of the parties.32 Even if the 
examiners were to become more critical of their own rulings, the 
30. 14 C.F.R. § 302.18(£) (1971). 
31. 14 C.F.R. § 302.18(£) (1971). 
32. The examiner's authority to set the time for filing intel"locutory appeal briefs 
(when he consents to a review) also reflects his position in the CAB, 14 C.F,R, § 302,18(£) 
(1971). 
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CAB has made it clear that interlocutory review is exceptional and 
is merited only when the examiner agrees that his ruling should be 
reviewed and finds that the appeal is necessary.33 As the Board ad-
monished in Southwestern Area Local-Service Case,34 "Rule 18(£) is 
designed to discourage and avoid interlocutory appeals except in 
extraordinary circumstances and in strict conformity to its pro-
visions."30 
The CAB maintains no index of interlocutory appeals. If a party 
requests an interlocutory review, that request is made orally to the 
examiner and will be denied without a written order; however, the 
request is preserved in the hearing record. The CAB's examiners and 
staff, as well as the private bar, generally assert that objections to 
interlocutory rulings are adequately considered in the review of the 
examiner's recommended decision by the Board. Private prac-
titioners, however, confidentially note that they are subject to con-
siderable restraint in seeking interlocutory review. Because rela-
tively few attorneys practice before the CAB, their relationship with 
the examiners must be a continuing one. Route determinations are 
sophisticated questions, in the resolution of which the examiner 
exercises wide discretion. As a result, private attorneys practicing be-
fore the CAB evidence a reluctance to press procedural objections 
in the face of the examiners' expressed dislike for interlocutory re-
view. On the other hand, these same practitioners concede that dis-
covery is not a significant problem in CAB hearings.36 Because of 
extensive reporting requirements, information is readily available, 
and discovery is normally granted if additional information is needed 
from other parties or from the Board's files. Thus, many of the 
critical procedural rulings often challenged by interlocutory appeal 
in other agencies are simply not present in CAB hearings. The situa-
tion, in other words, parallels our view of FPC practices. 
4. Securities and Exchange Commission 
Although the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) atten-
tion focuses primarily on the regulation by informal means of the 
issuance and trading of securities, two types of formal administrative 
33. In addition to imposing strict tests for reviewability, the rules provide that 
the interlocutory review shall not include oral argument unless the ·CAB so directs, 
and that the review does not automatically postpone the hearing. 14 G.F.R. §§ 302.IS(f), 
(g) (1971). 
34. 32 C.A.B. 1375 (1961). 
35. 32 C.A.B. at 1375. 
36. Maurer, Use of Discovery Procedures Before the C.A.B., 18 Ao. L. REv. 157 
(1966). 
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hearings do arise under the SEC statutes. The first resembles a licens-
ing procedure and involves an application by a person othenvise 
subject to this Commission's jurisdiction for exemption from (or 
approval pursuant to) specific regulatory requirements. Typical ex-
amples are applications under section 17(b) of the Investment Com-
pany Act of 194037 for permission to effect transactions between 
"certain affiliated persons,"38 or for declarations concerning the issu-
4nce of securiti(;!s under section 7 of the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935.311 
The second type of proceeding before the SEC is a complaint 
hearing instituted by the Commission's allegation that the respon-
dent failed to abide by one of the .securities acts or regulations. The 
most frequent of these involve disciplinary action against a broker-
dealer and associated individuals under sections 15(b)(5) and (7) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.40 Another example of this type 
of SEC hearing is a stop-order proceeding under the Securities Act 
of 1933.11 The licensing procedure is frequently adversary in nature, 
but the complaint pr-0ceeding more closely resembles a judicial trial. 
Interlocutory review of examiner rulings is occasionally sought in each. 
The history of the SEC hearing examiner's position in the con-
duct of adjudicatory proceedings-and in the making of interlocu-
tory rulings-reflects the increasing authority given presiding officers 
in most federal agencies as well as the increasing delegation of 
authority to employee boards or individuals below the commission 
level. Since the SEC's experience has been successful, and since it 
supports the experience of other well-managed agencies, we have 
spelled out the procedural changes in some detail with the design 
that the SEC's record might encourage other agencies to follow its 
lead. 
Initially, the examiner's authority at the SEC was limited,12 
Parties frequently sought an interlocutory ruling from the Commis-
sion because the question was beyond the scope of the examiner's 
pow~r to rule. Th«;!n, in 1960, the SEC expanded the hec;1ring officer's 
authority to rule on motions m4de during the course of a hearing. 
Motions were to be addressed to t,he e:µmi:Q.er, not the Commission, 
37. 15 U.S.C. § 80-,al7{b) (1964). 
38. 15 U.S.C. § ,80-a17 (1964). 
39. 15 U.S.C. § 79g (1964). Also included among the licensing type hearings would 
be applications for the extension of unlisted trading privileges under § 12(f) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(£) (1954). 
40, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(5), (7) (1964). 
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h(b), (d} (1964), 
42. See generally 3 L. Loss, S£CURITIEs REGULATION 1910·11 (2d ed. 1961), 
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and he was to rule upon them.4~ When a party excepted to a ruling 
by the examiner during the hearing, the examiner was to certify 
the challenge as requested to the Commission if he found "(1) that 
there [was] at issue a privilege not to answer questions posed; or 
(2) that a subsequent reversal of the ruling by the .Commission would 
unduly delay or prolong the proceeding or cause undue inconven-
ience to the parties, taking into consicleration the probability of such 
reversal."44 If the examiner determined that the test for certification 
was not met, a party could apply to the Commission for review, or 
the Commission could direct, on its own motion, that the matter be 
submitted to it. In any event, the hearing was to continue unless 
the examiner ordered othenvise.45 
The rules were further amended in 1964 to authori;I::!;! hearin.g 
officers to consider and rule on not only all motions made during 
the course of the hearing but also most prehearing motions.46 .More 
importantly, the Commission gave greater effect to interlocutory 
rulings by examiners by prescribing more restrictive conditions for 
appeals.47 Objections generally have to be made first to the hearing 
examiner. In addition, the examiner is not to certify a ruling for 
interlocutory review unless (a) a party so requests and (b) the exam-
,iner finds that a subsequent reversal of this ruling would (::ause 
"unusual delay or expense'' or that the ruling would compel dis-
closure of confidential SEC files or testimony from Commission per-
sonnel.48 Furthermore, the Director of the Office of Opinions and 
Review (the SEC's counterpart of the Review Boards utilized by the 
ICC and FCC) was delegated authority to affirm interlocutory rnJings 
by the examiner.49 Only the SEC can reverse an examiner's int!;!r-
locutory ruling, but it does not receive the matter until the Director 
indicates that he will not affirm the examiner. There are a few items 
beyond the examiner's authority that must be presented .directly .to 
43. SEC Rule XII(a), 25 Fed. Reg. 6731-32 (1960), as amended, 17 C.F.R. § 29l.12 
(1971). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Securities Act Release No. 33-4674 (March 20, 1964), 17 C.F.R. § 201.12(a) (1971). 
47. 17 C,F.R. § 201.12(a) (1971). 
48. 17 C.F,R. § 201.12(a) (1971). The overriding standard is established in the first 
sentence of the Commission's curre.nt rules: "The Commission will not review a ruling 
of the hearing officer prior to its consideration of the entire proceeding in the absence 
of extraordinary circumstances." Id. 
49. 17 C.F.R". §§ 200.30-6(a)(l)(i)-(ii) (1971), pursuant to Act of Aui. 20, 1962, Pub. 
L. No. 87-592, §§ 1-2, 76 Stat. 394-95, codified at 11> p.s,c. ~§ 7!ld-I; i:l-2 (1964). See 
S. REP. No. 776, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. REP. No. 2045, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1962). If he finds it appropriate, the Director may submit a case to the Commission 
even though he would affirm the e.'Caminer's ruling. 
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the Commission (e.g., applications to intervene and requests to add or 
delete issues).50 In line with these developments, the SEC has liberal-
ized its discovery rules. 51 
The statistics on SEC hearings and interlocutory appeals are 
shown in Table II. As Table II indicates, despite a substantial case-
load, there are few interlocutory appeals in SEC proceedings. 
TABLE II 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS IN SEC HEARINGS 
Fiscal Year 
1968 1969 1970 
Interlocutory appeals from examiner rulings 4 4 s 
Direct interlocutory action (to SEC only) 4 4 4 
Adjudications pending (workload) 147 225 300 
Adjudications disposed of 
without hearing 53 6'i 107 
after hea1ing 21 19 44 
Adjudications docketed 58 152 158 
Because the number of interlocutory appeals was so small and the 
SEC's records ·were carefully indexed, we were able to review the 
record in each case. The pertinent summary of the records in the 
16 cases in which interlocutory review of hearing examiner rulings 
was pursued appears in Table III. The interval between the filing 
by the parties of their request for certification or petition for review 
TABLE III 
SUM:MARY OF RECORDS IN INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS 
Nature of examiner ruling 
Evidentiary 
Discovery 
Procedural 
Bias 
Examiner ruling on review request 
Certified 
Not certified 
Ruling of review authority 
Affirming 
Reversing/Modifying 
5 
11 
16 
Director, 0 &: R 
10 
SEC 
3 
7 
• Several interlocutory appeals involved more than one ruling or issue; consequently, 
the totals vary. 
50. 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.11, .12(b) (1971). 
51. See Frankhauser &: Bellman, The Right to lnformatio11 in the Administrative 
Process: A Look at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 18 An. L. REv. 101 (1969). 
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and the disposition of the matter by the Commission or by the Di-
rector averaged 25 days, with a fourth of this time consumed by 
briefing and oral argument. In every instance, the hearing delay 
resulting from interlocutory review was inconsequential, for in none 
of the proceedings in which an appeal was prosecuted during the 
hearing was the trial postponed. It is less clear, however, whether 
the prehearing appeals affected the time schedule. Interlocutory 
appeals are usually sought by respondents. The Commission and the 
Director have not been reluctant to reverse the examiners (although 
the examiners were upheld in a majority of appeals).52 However, in 
general, parties have been deterred from pressing interlocutory ap-
peals. The picture with respect to direct interlocutory actions to the 
Commission during these three fiscal years (1968-1970) is similar to 
that of interlocutory appeals. None of the actions-which involved 
questions beyond the examiner's authority and, therefore, had not 
been ruled upon by him-directly contributed to delay. Most were 
prehearing motions (usually to alter the scope of the hearing) and the 
others (procedural complaints or third-party attempts to intervene) 
did not cause the hearing to be postponed. 03 On the other hand, it 
seems likely that hearings might have been scheduled earlier had no 
interlocutory appeal been taken or had the issue been ruled upon 
by the examiner. 
The sum and substance of this analysis, therefore, is that inter-
locutory review of examiner rulings has been handled sensibly and 
expeditiously by the SEC. At first glance, it might seem inconsistent 
to require examiner certification before an interlocutory review can 
be pressed, and then to allow appeals to be presented when the 
examiner finds that the requirements of certification are not met; 
but the deterrent impact of the examiner's decision not to certify 
must be noted. It may well be concluded from the relatively few ap-
peals (in comparison with the number of administrative proceedings 
before examiners) that an SEC examiner's refusal to certify discour-
ages most appeals. The Commission's delegation of authority to the 
Director of Opinions and Review to affirm, but not to reverse, the 
examiners' ruling-s encourages consistent, well-reasoned decisions. 
The rules are still vague on precisely what matters are beyond the 
examiner's authority and must be presented directly to the Commis-
sion. 54 There does not appear to be any justification for retention of 
52. See Table m supra. 
53. However, one quarter (four) of the appeals were filed in one proceeding, in 
which an applicant sought approval of its acquisition of an electric utility under the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act. See American Elec. Power Co., SEC Docket !!-1476. 
54. 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.ll(e), .12(b) (1971). 
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this separate procedure, which, at one time, governed all interloc-
utory appeals. In other words, we think that the Commission's pro-
cedures have operated so successfully that they should be pursued 
to their next logical conclusion and that all questions should be 
ruled upon by the examiner, certified or denied certification by the 
examiner, and decided on interlocutory appeal by the Director. 
5. Federal Trade Commission 
"Problems of delay have vexed the FTC ever since it was estab-
lished, and some of the most notorious examples of protracted admin-
istrative proceedings have occurred in that agency."GG Even with a 
declining caseload, the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) ponder-
ous investigative and adjudicative proceedings "continue to produce 
decisions based on stale and unreliable evidence and to undermine 
effective enforcement."56 This harsh judgment by the American Bar 
Association's FTC Study Commission is not a new one. The FTC's 
internal operations, including its hearing procedures, have been 
thoroughly analyzed and castigated by authorities almost since the 
agency's birth.57 It is surprising then, if our recollection is accurate, 
that except for former Commissioner Elman's critique, none of these 
studies examine the FTC's promiscuous interlocutory practice or 
suggest that it contributes substantially to adjudicative delay.us 
FTC adjudications are complaint cases; that is, the hearing is 
held to determine whether a charged respondent has violated federal 
laws proscribing restraints of trade, deceptive practices, or misleading 
labels. 59 Although the Commission has authority in many cases to 
55. ABA CoMM. To STUDY THE FTC, REPORT 28 (1969) [hereinafter ABA REPORT]. 
56. Id. at 32. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 414 F.2d 974 (7th 
Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970). 
57. See, e.g., ABA REPORT, supra note 55; T. BLAISDELL, THE FTC: AN EXPERIMENT 
IN THE CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1924); E. Cox, R. FELLMETH &: J. SCHULZ, THE NADAR RE· 
PORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE Co1111111ss10N (1969); Cor.IMN. ON EXECUTIVE Ono., TASK FORCE 
ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS app. N (1949); G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION; A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE (1924); '.ROBERT HELLER 
&: AssOCIATES, INC., FTC MANAGEMENT SURVEY REPORT (1954); SENATE COMM, ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., !.ANDIS REPORT ON THE REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE 
PRESIDENT-ELEcr (Comm. Print 1960); U.S. CIVIL SERV, COMMN., EVALUATION OF PERSON• 
NEL MANAGEMENT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1965); Auerbach, The Federal Trade 
Commission: Internal Organization and Procedure, 48 MINN. L. REv. 383 (1964); Elman, 
Administrative Reform: The Federal Trade Commission, in SENATE CoMllt, ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 9lsr CONG., lsr SESS., RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE ON CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT 
AND RESPONSIVE DEc1s10N-MAKING 122 (Comm. Print 1969); Elman, A. Modest Proposal 
for Radical Reform, 56 A.B.A.J. 1045 (1970). 
58. See authorities cited in note 57 w.pra. 
59. For a current list of the stattites that the FTC has been assigned to cnfo,:ce, 
see ABA REPORT, supra note 55, at 6-7. 
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seek preliminary injunctive relief, it seldom does so.6° Consequently, 
a challenged practice is not directly affected by the adjudicative 
hearing until a final order is issued and implemented; and then the 
sanction consists of only a proscriptive cease-and-desist order. In 
other words, respondents have strong incentives to delay the hearing. 
At one time, the FTC's rules placed no restriction on interloc-
utory appeals from examiner rulings.61 As examiners were delegated 
greater authority, the right to appeal was limited-at least in theory. 
For the past few years, interlocutory review has been at the Commis-
sion's discretion; the examiner has had no control over it. A cumber-
some, two-step procedure must be invoked. 62 First, within five days 
after notice of the examiner's interlocutory ruling, the complaining 
party must file a request of not more than ten pages for permission 
to appeal.63 "Permission will not be granted except upon a showing 
that the ruling complained of involves substantial rights and will 
materially affect the final decision, and that a determination of its 
correctness before conclusion of the hearing is essential to serve the 
interests of justice."64 Although the rules are silent in this regard, 
responsive briefs opposing requests to appeal may be filed. 65 Once 
permission is granted, the second step becomes the actual appeal. 
The appellants are directed to file briefs of not over 30 pages within 
five days after permission has been granted; the appellees, within five 
days after the appeal brief is served.66 On occasion, the entire Com-
mission has heard oral argument during this second stage, even 
though the rules again make no provision for it. 67 The rules do 
provide that "[t]he appeal shall not operate to suspend the hearings 
unless otherwise ordered by the hearing examiner or the Commis-
60. In fact, the ITC recently used this power for the first time in eight years. 
Medi-Hair Intl., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11 19,442 (FTC 1971). See BNA, ATRR No. 
500, at A-13 (Feb. 16, 1971). 
61. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.20(b)(l) (1960). 
62. 16 C.F.R. § 3.23 (1971). 
63. 16 C.F.R. § 3.23(a) (1971). 
64. 16 C.F.R. § 3.23(a) (1971). This language was adopted in fiscal 1968. 33 Fed. 
Reg. 7032 (1968). The previous test limited permission to appeal to a showing of 
"extraordinary circumstances where an immediate decision by the Commission is clearly 
necessary to prevent detriment to the public interest." 16 C.F.R. § 3.20(a) (1967). The 
rule change apparently was designed to articulate the factors previously applied under 
the public interest test. 
65. See, e.g., Koppers Co., Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 
11 16,879, at 21,023 (FTC 1969). 
66. 16 C.F.R. § 3.23(b) (1971). 
67. See, e.g., Suburban Propane Gas Corp., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. 
REP. 1117,965, at 20,336 (FTC 1967). 
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sion."68 The routine practice, however, is for the examiner to post-
pone the proceeding pending interlocutory review. 
There are two exceptions to this discretionary review system. 
First, the FTC's permission is not required to appeal rulings on 
requests for admissions or rulings on compulsory processes.00 On the 
other hand, these appeals will be "entertained" by the FTC only 
when the aggrieved party makes the "showing" required for other 
interlocutory appeals.70 Apparently the first step----that is, the peti-
tion-to-appeal stage-is dispensed with and the decision whether to 
entertain the appeal and whether to grant or deny it is accomplished 
on reading the appeal briefs. When this exception was brought to 
the attention of staff attorneys and FTC practitioners, they vaguely 
recalled it but conceded that they relied upon the two-step approach 
in making such appeals.71 In other words, the Commission's experi-
ence here is at variance with its rules. The second exception involves 
examiner orders to disclose confidential information within the Com-
mission's files or an examiner's suspension of an attorney.72 Inter-
locutory review of these sensitive rulings is automatically allowed; 
in fact, the decision to release confidential FTC files may be reviewed 
on the Commission's own motion if no party complains.73 
These rules were adopted to restrict interlocutory appeals. Re-
view by the FTC is not a right. On the contrary, it is to be granted 
only when a stringent test is met-when failure to review is likely 
to cause greater delay or unnecessary and substantial harm.74 More-
over, the Commission, rather than the parties or the examiner, de-
termines whether this test is met. Compliance with its rules, therefore, 
would seem simple to assure. 
If ever a gap existed between rule and reality, the FTC proce-
dures and practices illustrate it. The number of interlocutory ap-
peals, especially when compared to the number of adjudicative hear-
ings on the docket, is astonishing. The statistics for three fiscal 
years are shmm in Table IV. Once again, however, these sta-
tistics do not tell the whole story. An interlocutory order issues even 
when no appeal from an examiner's ruling is allowed because the 
Commission must, in every case, rule on the petition to appeal. 
68. 16 C.F.R. § 3.23(b) (1971). 
69. 16 C.F.R. § 3.35(b) (1971). 
70. 16 C.F.R. § 3.35(b) (1971). 
71. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. ,i 19,545 (FTC 1971), 
72. 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.36(d)-(e), .42(d) (1971). 
73. 16 C.F.R. § 3.36(e) (1971). 
74. 16 C.F.R. § 3.23(a) (1971). 
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TABLE IV71! 
INTERLOCUTORY .APPEALS IN FTC HEARINGS 
Interlocutory appeals from examiner rulings 
Adjudications pending (workload) 
Adjudications disposed of by examiners 
Adjudications docketed (complaints issued) 
1968 
80 
61 
35 
23 
Fiscal Year 
1969 
81 
51 
24 
23 
127 
1970 
116 
60 
22 
35 
These orders are not reflected in Table IV when the petition to 
appeal is granted. The two-step process means that two orders are 
commonly issued when an appeal is allowed. (However, the two 
exceptions permitting appeals as a matter of right result in only one 
FTC order per interlocutory appeal.) Of course, this does not mean 
that all interlocutory orders are equal or that they consume the same 
amount of Commission or hearing-examiner time. 
There are other more significant aspects to these :figures. First, 
the FTC's recordkeeping renders all its statistics suspect. A check 
of the listing of interlocutory orders by dates supplied by the Com-
mission staff revealed several errors. Orders were listed when the 
Commission issued no order in that docket on that date; other orders 
were omitted. These errors could not be corrected since the FTC 
maintains no separate record of interlocutory orders and opinions. 
These errors in themselves, however, probably do not pose a serious 
problem for our study since it does not seem likely that they would 
be weighted in one direction; in fact they probably cancel each 
other. More importantly, the thrust of this study is a qualitative, 
as well as a quantitative, analysis of the Commission's interlocutory 
review practice, so that the particular accuracy of any one number 
is of little significance. Second, and of more serious consequence, is 
the probable substantial overstatement of the number of interloc-
utory appeals that interfere with adjudicative hearings before an 
examiner. Many appeals involve questions of discovery; hence they 
do not always delay the proceeding substantially. Even more relate 
to post-hearing questions (e.g., requests by the examiner for addi-
tional time to prepare his initial decision or requests by the parties 
relating to their appeal from the initial decision). These routine re-
quests invariably involve no delay, are decided by the "motions" 
Commissioner without coming before the full Commission, and 
neither postpone the hearing nor affect the examiner's direction of 
it. Therefore, as a check on these statistics, we made an intensive 
75. These figures were supplied by the Office of General Counsel of the FTC. 
They cannot be reconciled with the FTC's annual reports, however. See, e.g., FTC 
ANNUAL REPORT 57 (1970). 
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study of all interlocutory appeals decided in the second half of fiscal 
1970. Of the 53 interlocutory appeals decided during this interval, 
40% did not involve interlocutory review of examiner rulings. Since 
this period is probably representative, we think that the number of 
interlocutory appeals for these three fiscal years is closer to 160 
than to the 277 reported. Our analysis, therefore, is based upon this 
discounted figure. 
This downward adjustment of figures representing the FTC's 
interlocutory interference with adjudicative hearings still leaves an 
inordinate number of appeals in comparison with the Commission's 
limited adjudicative caseload. Using fiscal 1970 as a baseline, there 
were 70 (discounted) interlocutory appeals from examiner rulings in 
the 60 cases then pending. Yet these statistics substantially under-
state the role of interlocutory appeals at the FTC, for of the 60 
pending cases, 22 were disposed of by the examiner during the year 
(and thus were not subject to interlocutory appeal for part of the 
period) and 35 involved newly issued complaints (with no oppor-
tunity often for either party to have obtained interlocutory relief). 
Consequently, there were 70 appeals in the approximately 35 active 
cases before FTC examiners in fiscal 1970-an average of two appeals 
per active case. This conclusion is supported by a staff study of inter-
locutory appeals for fiscal years 1966 to 1969, which determined that 
72% of the 172 active cases in that period had at least one interloc-
utory appeal or certification interrupting the proceeding and that 
many hearings were subject to multiple interlocutory action.70 The 
significance of these figures and the extraordinary scope of FTC 
review of interlocutory rulings is further emphasized when the FTC 
statistics are compared with those supplied by other agencies. 
Because interlocutory appeals are so numerous and so common, 
they cause a significant interruption in FTC adjudications, especially 
since hearings are routinely postponed and pretrial activity delayed 
pending the Commission's decision.77 We sought to document this 
interference. We discovered that the average delay resulting from 
FTC interlocutory appeals during the last half of fiscal 1970 was 
only 18 days-that is, the FTC's interlocutory order was filed, on 
the average, 18 days after review was first sought. It was found that 
15% of these appeals were decided within a week, and only one re-
quired more than two months to decide. Thus, individual appeals 
are seldom responsible for delaying the proceeding, although several 
76. Memorandum from Joseph J. Gercke, Chairman of the FTC Administrative 
Proc. &: Rules Comm., to FTC, March 25, 1970, on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
77. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 78-80 infra. 
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proceedings in which the delay was substantial were encountered.78 
The delay and unwarranted interference that staff attorneys and 
hearing examiners, as well as most practitioners, complain about is 
due, therefore, to the excessive number of appeals in single cases 
and the cumulative delay that results. For example, one of the 15 
cases with interlocutory appeals decided in the second half of fiscal 
1970 was interrupted by 7 interlocutory orders during that 
period and by a total of 26 interlocutory orders over a I½ year 
period. 70 The case is not sui generis-over half of the cases inter-
rupted in this six-month period were subject to 2 or more inter-
locutory orders.so 
Perhaps the Commission's frequent interlocutory review would 
be justified if the appeals expedited proceedings by avoiding pre-
judicial error and ultimate remand, or if the salutary effects of close 
supervision of examiner performance outweighed the costs involved. 
Yet such benefits are not apparent from the record. Although al-
most one quarter of the interlocutory appeals (7 of 30) decided dur-
ing the period of January to June 1970 resulted in a reversal of the 
examiner's ruling, few involved supervision of the examiner's con-
duct of the hearing. Only four granted discovery to respondent (and 
two of these were automatically appealable requests for discoverv 
from FTC personnel). Of the other decisions, two modified the con-
fidential protection given sensitive materials, and one allowed a 
pleading to be amended. On the other hand, examiners were up-
held in almost two thirds of the appeals (19 of 30), most of which 
sought additional discovery or reversal of an examiner's refusal to 
dismiss a complaint. These latter appeals were often patently friv-
olous or dilatory. In other cases the Commission continued its 
78. In Suburban Propane Gas Corp., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 
,r 17,965, at 20,336 (FTC 1967), the FTC required 15 months to decide which party 
had the burden of proof on one critical issue. Because of this and other interlocutory 
appeals, a lapse of almost 3 years occurred between issuance of the complaint and 
the beginning of the hearing-which was ultimately dismissed. More recently, the 
Commission delayed a false advertising hearing for 4½ months, only to deny inter-
locutory review of an examiner's decision rejecting cross-motions for summary decision. 
Union Carbide Corp., FTC Docket 8811 (March 12, 1971) (interlocutory order). Thus, 
even after this inordinate delay, neither the examiners nor the parties were advised 
of the standards that examiners should apply in ruling upon motions for summary 
decision. See also Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 3 _TRADE REG. REP. ,r 19,455 (FTC 1971) 
(interlocutory order). 
79. Koppers Co., Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. ,r 16,879, at 
21,023 (FTC 1969). 
80. Koppers Co., Inc., FTC Docket 8804; Diener's, Inc., FTC Docket 8804; OKC 
Corp., FTC Docket 8802; Verranzzano Trading Corp., FTC Docket 8801; American 
Brands, Inc., FTC Docket 8799; Sterling Drug, Inc., FTC Docket 8797; Hollywood Credit 
Clothing Co., FTC Docket 8796; Eastern Detective Academy, Inc., FTC Docket 8793; 
Kennecott Copper Corp., FTC Docket 8765, 
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restrictive approach to discovery of information from its files. The 
remaining appeals (4 of 30) involved disputes over housekeeping 
items (e.g., additional time to seek interlocutory relief) or matters 
beyond the examiner's authority (e.g., preliminary injunction in a 
merger proceeding). 
We strongly concur, therefore, with the judgment of all FTC 
examiners, and of most staff or private attorneys, that a rule revision 
severely restricting interlocutory review would be a step toward im-
proving the operation of FTC hearings. Interlocutory appeals in 
FTC adjudications are today generally unsuccessful; they seldom 
involve particularly important matters when they are allowed. A 
selective right of appeal would furnish adequate protection in par-
ticularly sensitive areas, and a reduction in the number of the FTC'i; 
redundant interlocutory opinions would prove no loss. But it must 
be noted that interlocutory appeal procedures themselves are of 
little significance in the whole picture of FTC adjudications. The 
major cause of adjudicative delay at the FTC does not stem from 
the interlocutory procedure, but rather is caused by the Commis-
sion's unwillingness to open its files for discovery, its uncertainty 
with respect to protection of confidential information made available 
for trial purposes, and its reluctance either to remove incentives 
for delay (i.e., to obtain preliminary injunctive relief) or to punish 
delaying tactics. 81 
6. National Labor Relations Board 
Most adversary hearings before the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) concern complaint cases involving unfair labor 
practice charges.82 Relief may include reinstatement of an employee 
with back pay (and interest), prohibition of future misconduct, or 
similar action designed to neutralize the impact of past abuses.83 As 
81. Former FTC Commissioner Elman's trenchant summary is, typically, indicative 
and accurate: "[B)y its penchant for secrecy, its refusal to grant respondents adequate 
discovery, its intrusion in areas better handled by the hearing examiner, and by its 
failure to plan its docket, the [Federal Trade] Commission has vitiated and degraded its 
quasi-judicial power." Elman, Administrative Reform: The Federal Trade Commission, 
supra note 57, at 160. 
82. Representation cases are not included in this study because as a matter of 
practice the parties generally do not seek interlocutory review of c."'aminer rulings. 
Several reasons are offered in explanation: representation hearings are not truly 
adversary; they are investigative; and, most importantly, the regional director's decision 
is only the predicate for an election, which may then be challenged to the Board. The 
Board's rules, however, do make provision for review of interlocutory rulings by 
examiners in representation cases. 29 C.F.R. § 102.65(c) (1971). 
83. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964). Although the statute does not provide for interest on 
back pay, cases do in fact allow it. See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 413 F,2d 
1008 (5th Cir. 1969); Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962), 
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with many agencies, the NLRB maintains no separate record of inter-
locutory appeals; so our report is necessarily fragmentary. Neverthe-
less, we believe that from the data we collected a representative 
picture can be presented. 
The NLRB's caseload is heavy. There were, for example, 18,651 
unfair labor practice complaints in fiscal 1969.84 However, 92% of 
these complaints were disposed of prior to a formal hearing by dis-
missal, voluntary withdrawal, or settlement of the charge.85 In recent 
years, trial examiners have annually issued over 900 initial decisions 
in unfair labor practice controversies; and their workload has ex-
ceeded 1,400 cases per year.86 To be sure, the hearings are short, gen-
erally lasting no more than three or four days, and the amount 
in controversy is usually quite limited; that is, the costs of the 
hearing and the economic stake in each case are small compared 
with those of other agencies (e.g., FCC, FPC, and FTC), although 
the hearing is, of course, important to the particular employee and is 
usually of concern to his employer or union. In addition, there is no 
urge, in most cases, to delay the proceeding. When back pay is in issue 
and interest is to be assessed, there would seem to be some induce-
ment for expedition on the part of the employer. On the other hand, 
the Board's orders carry no immediate sanction and enforcement is 
secured only by petitioning a federal court of appeals.87 Occasionally 
the Board asks a district court, under section IOG) of the National 
Labor Relations Act,88 for temporary injunctive relief to stop the 
challenged practice pending a hearing. 
Despite the NLRB's caseload, only an average of approximately 
30 interlocutory appeals from examiner rulings in unfair labor 
practice cases are filed annually-although the number increased to 
45 during the first nine months of 1970.89 From this information 
84. NLRB .ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1969). 
85. Id. at 4. 
86. Id. at 9-10, 17. 
87. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964). See Recommendation 10 of the Administrative Con-
ference of the United States, Judidal Enforcement of Orders of the National Labor 
Relations Board, in AD. CoNF. 1969 ANNUAL REPORT 41 (1970); Recommendation 18 of 
the Administrative Conference of the United States (1961-1962), S. Doc. No. 24, 88th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1963). 
88. 29 u.s.c. ,§ 160G) (1964). See NLRB .ANNUAL REPORT 160-64, 238 (1969). 
89. Information on interlocutory appeals from examiner rulings in unfair labor 
practice cases was obtained by searching the daily log and docket files maintained in 
the Solicitor's Office, the only record on interlocutory appeals kept by the NLRB. 
Since the log begins with January 1, 1968, our information covers only the 2¾ years 
between that date and the time the record was made available to us. 
The log book, moreover, is not wholly accurate. Before investigating the files we 
counted 21 interlocutory appeals in the 2¾ year period. On closer examination, it 
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one might expect that the Board's rules or practices strictly limit 
the right to seek interlocutory review. In fact, however, they resemble 
the FTC's two-step method. The NLRB rules provide that an 
examiner's interlocutory orders "shall not be appealed directly to 
the Board except by special permission of the Board."00 Permission 
is sought by filing a request with the Board "promptly, in ·writing, 
and ... briefly stat[ing] the grounds relied on."01 Thus, the examiner 
plays no role in determining whether interlocutory review will be 
granted. The rules imply that the Board will first decide whether 
review shall be granted and, once permission is granted, will then 
consider the appeal. 
As a practical matter, the Board's interlocutory appeal procedure 
involves but one step and is handled informally. If interlocutory 
review is sought during the hearing, one of the parties will send 
its request by telegram to the Board. The information available to 
the Board at this stage is scanty; it has only the complaining party's 
request, the examiner's ruling, and occasionally an opposing party's 
reply. The complaint and other papers are often located elsewhere 
since the Board is located in Washington and hearings are held 
throughout the country. The Solicitor's Office advises the Board 
whether, in its opinion, the request should be allowed. Interlocutory 
appeals are decided by a panel of three-not by the entire five-
member Board. At least one Board member is present when the ap-
peal is discussed; the other two generally send a representative from 
their legal staff who exercises a proxy vote and later advises his 
Board member of the decision. The Board's decision is reached 
quickly (usually by accepting the Solicitor's advice), and the parties 
are usually advised of the ruling the day after the appeal is received. 
This informal system operates efficiently, as it must if the brief unfair 
labor practice hearing is not to be delayed. Few interlocutory appeals 
cause a hearing to be interrupted, although in our review of the 
record we found two cases that delayed proceedings for several 
months. Only a very few cases are subjected to more than one 
interlocutory appeal. 
"We studied the interlocutory appeals to the Board for one 12-
was clear that many did not involve interlocutory review of examiner rulings. Our 
findings, then, by calendar year, were that the Board heard 32 interlocutory appeals 
from examiner rulings in 1968, 33 in 1969, and 45 during the first 9 months of 1970. 
90. 29 C.F.R. § 102.26 (1971). 
91. 29 C.F.R. § 102.26 (1971). 
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month period (calendar year 1969) more intensively. There were 33 
appeals in this period. From the records in these cases, which were 
often incomplete, we collected the data shown in Table V. The delay 
TABLE V 
ANALYSIS OF INTERLOCUTORY Al>PEAIS IN 1969 
Complaint charged violation by 
Employer 
Union 
Other 
Interlocutory appeal sought by 
General Counsel-NLRB 
Employer 
Board action on interlocutory appeal 
Granted 
Denied 
Board action sustained position of 
General Counsel-NLRB 
Employer 
Subject matter of interlocutory appeal 
Evidentiary ruling 
Discovery 
Procedural 
24 
10 
2 
12 
8 
20 .. 
13 
20 
33 
14 
6 
20 .. 
17 
3 
13 
33 
• Three cases involved charges against both employers and unions. 
• • Only 20 of the 33 records contained information on these points. 
occasioned by interlocutory appeals during this 12-month period 
averaged 7 days. This figure, however, is distorted by 2 protracted 
appeals; hence, the usual delay appeared to be less than 2 days. 
The appeals from procedural rulings were disparate and could not 
be otherwise categorized. 
NLRB examiners, staff attorneys, and private practitioners we 
contacted were generally satisfied with the Board's interlocutory ap-
peal procedure. Proceedings are not inordinately interrupted as a 
consequence of this procedure, yet a safety valve is available. The· 
competency and experience of the Solicitor's Office is critical; it is 
ably staffed. The willingness of the Board to rely upon the decision 
of one member and two proxies is considered an essential feature, 
although it seems questionable whether the number of interlocutory 
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appeals supports this assertion and whether this informal delegation 
does not in fact exceed congressional authorization.02 The signifi-
cance of interlocutory review is reduced by NLRB rule provisions 
explicitly permitting review of an examiner's interlocutory rulings 
"if exception to the ruling or order is included in the statement of 
exceptions filed with the Board."03 The cost of remand and retrial, 
which such procedure might necessitate, is less significant when 
the entire proceeding consumes less than a week of trial time. 
The most important-and most limiting-feature of the Board's in-
terlocutory appeal practice, however, is the restricted scope of the 
subject matter. Interlocutory questions appealed in the usual manner 
to the Board seldom involve complex or novel questions. Decisions 
are made without briefs and upon a sparse synopsis of the case. Con-
sequently, the adaptability of the NLRB's procedure to agencies with 
more complex proceedings is questionable. Nevertheless, its consid-
eration by agencies with substantial caseloads and relatively simple 
hearings seems advisable. 
7. Summary 
This survey of six agencies suggests that interlocutory appeals 
have not, in themselves, substantially contributed to delay of admin-
istrative proceedings. The possible exception is the FTC where, al-
though individual appeals are handled expeditiously in most cases, 
the number of appeals is so overwhelming that the cumulative delay 
is substantial. It may be, however, that self-selection has operated to 
minimize the impact of interlocutory appeals within the agencies we 
studied. First, this study concentrated on the independent regulatory 
agencies, whose procedures tend to be the most sophisticated. What 
is true of their interlocutory procedures may not follow in other 
agencies. Second, our study was limited. It sought to measure the 
impact of interlocutory review from the available records, which 
were seldom complete. A true measure of interlocutory appeals 
should not stop with a review of selected representative cases and 
qualitative interviews with agency personnel and practitioners. The 
92. Authority to delegate review functions to an employee board has been granted 
to the ICC (49 U.S.C. § 17 (1964)); to the FCC (47 U.S.C. § 155(d)(l) (1964)); to the 
CAB (49 U.S.C. § 1324 (1964)); to the FTC (Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1961, 75 Stat, 838, 
following 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1964)); to the Federal Maritime Commn, (46 U.S.C. § llll 
(1964)); and to the SEC (15 U.S.C. §78d-l (1964)). 
93. 29 C.F.R. § 102.26 (1971). 
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cost of a more extended study, however, did not appear to be worth 
the likely gain. 
Even if the interlocutory appeal procedures of most agencies are 
tolerable, useful recommendations can still be offered. The FCC and 
SEC, whose interlocutory appeal procedures appear sound and sen-
sible in most respects, frequently deny their examiners authority to 
rule initially on interlocutory questions, even though they are al-
ready familiar with the issues being raised. These agencies also per-
mit the parties to reargue interlocutory motions in each case by 
briefs to the review authority, thus permitting unnecessary delay. 
The FPC and CAB have virtually eliminated interlocutory appeals, 
but perhaps at too high a cost to a free adversary exchange. The 
FTC's procedures are overly complex and are apparently ignored 
in actual practice. Despite formally restrictive procedures, interloc-
utory review by the FTC is almost automatic. The NLRB's informal 
methods do not seem adaptable to agencies with more complex 
cases. 
On the other hand, the experience of these six agencies indicates 
that they are increasingly delegating to their hearing examiners 
additional authority to decide initially all questions and to control 
(in most cases) the availability of interlocutory review. Consequently, 
fewer matters are being appealed to review authorities during initial 
agency proceedings. When kept within reasonable limits, this devel-
opment has improved the level of agency hearings. Although there 
are exceptions, it seems clear that this process should be encouraged 
and extended. · 
Ill. THE JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE WITH 
INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW 
The direction of federal court experience with interlocutory 
appeals contrasts with that of the agencies. The tendency in the 
courts has been to broaden rather than narrow the opportunity for 
interlocutory review. However, the independence of federal dis-
trict judges has never been in doubt, and any change expanding ap-
pellate review of interlocutory rulings is narrowly curtailed by strict 
standards and by the discretion of both the trial and appellate courts. 
The starting point for understanding the judicial analogue is the 
final judgment rule, which provides that an appeal may be taken 
only from a final decision and not from an interlocutory ruling.94 
94. E.g., 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1-292 (2d ed. 1966); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL 
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This rule not only seeks to prohibit interim appeals that a final 
decision may make moot, but also reflects a basic decision regarding 
the proper relationship between trial and appellate courts. The trial 
judge is independent and most of his decisions are not subject to 
check and reconsideration.95 "Appeal gives the upper court a power 
to review, not one of intervention."06 
The final judgment rule has always been subject to exceptions. 
On the one hand, there are the prerogative ·writs-prohibition and 
mandamus.97 These writs are designed primarily to control a trial 
court's abuse of its jurisdiction.98 On the other hand, there are sev-
eral statutory exceptions that authorize an immediate challenge to 
"orders of serious, perhaps irreparable consequence."90 The tradi-
tional interlocutory order freely subject to immediate appellate re-
view (by statutory directive) is the ruling on a party's request for 
preliminary injunctive relief. Neither procedure, however, is closely 
related to most interim rulings by agency hearing examiners. The 
agency initially determines the scope of its jurisdiction when the 
case is docketed, and in any event the issue of jurisdiction is seldom 
within the examiner's province.100 Similarly, administrative agencies 
apparently do not have a trial court's power to issue peremptory 
interlocutory orders.101 
There is one limitation on the final judgment rule that does 
relate to agency review of interlocutory orders issued by a trial 
examiner. Congress modified the final judgment rule by enacting 
the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958.102 This Act empowers any 
COURTS §§ 101-02, at 452-63 (1970); Crick, The Final Judgment As a Basis for Appeal, 
41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932); Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEXAS L. 
REv. 292 (1966); Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARV, L. REv. 351 (1961). 
While a few states, notably New York, depart from the final judgment rule and 
generally allow appeals from interlocutory orders, they do not allow appeals during 
the course of a trial. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 50 (1965). 
95. See Note, Interlocutory Appeal from Orders Striking Class Action Allegations, 
70 COLOM. L. REv. 1292, 1302 (1970). 
96. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
97. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 94, § 102, at 461-62. 
98. Id. 
99. Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955). See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a) (1964); 11 U.S.C. §§ 47-48 (1964). 
100. E.g., 47 C.F.R. § 1.29l(a)(2) (1971). 
101. See ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 485 (1894) (dictum). See generally I K. 
DAVIS, ADI'lfiNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.11, at 212-15 (1958); W, GELLHORN &: C, BYSE, 
.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 610-11 (4th ed. 1960). 
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964). See Bourdeaux, Federal Interlocutory Appeals Act-
A Five Year View, 35 MISS. L.J. 55 (1963); Wright, The Interlocutory Appeals Act of 
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district judge to certify for immediate appeal an order "not other-
wise appealable" if in his opinion the order involves a "controlling 
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference 
of opinion and [in which] an immediate appeal ... may materially 
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."103 The grant of 
permission to appeal-even though certified by the district court-is 
further subject to the discretion of the court of appeals.104 District 
courts understandably have not been overly sympathetic to claims 
of error. Neither have they been easily persuaded that the order 
involves a "controlling question of law" or that immediate appeal 
will speed the final determination.105 It is not surprising, then, that 
this exception has not been of much importance. Indeed, in only 
about 1/10 of 1 % of all cases filed in the district courts do trial judges 
certify an interlocutory ruling to the court of appeals.106 It is, at 
most, a crack in the otherwise impenetrable wall insulating trial 
court procedures from appellate review. 
Even with these exceptions, the practical effect of the final judg-
ment rule is that many (probably most) areas of procedure are largely 
the domain of trial court law. This is true of the law governing pre-
trial procedures as well as that concerning the conduct of the trial. 
This fact puts great responsibility on the trial courts in these areas; 
the consensus is that "in the federal system, at any rate, this is prob-
ably not misplaced."107 
IV. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The overriding lesson from this study is that agencies have been 
unnecessarily reluctant to delegate sufficient authority to their ex-
aminers. Immediate reconsideration of discovery orders and review 
1958, 23 F.R.D. 199 (1959); Note, Section 1292 (b): Eight Years of Undefined Discretion, 
54 GEO. L.J. 940 (1966). 
103. 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) (1964). The court of appeals is not required to accept the 
appeal. Section 1292(b) provides, rather, that after the appeal is certified the court of 
appeals "may ••• in its discretion ••. permit" it to be taken. 
104. 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1J ll0.22[4], at 264-65 (2d ed. 1970). 
105. E.g., A. Olinick&: Sons v. Dempster Bros., Inc., 365 F.2d 439,443 (2d Cir. 1966). 
See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON FED. RULES OF PROC., REPORT, 38 F.R.D. 95, 104 (1965). 
106. Out of over 80,000 civil cases pending in the district courts during fiscal 1969, 
only 101 interlocutory appeals were certified, and the courts of appeal allowed the 
challenge to the trial court's ruling in only 64 of these cases. By contrast, over 10,000 
appeals from final judgments were taken to the courts of appeal in this same period. 
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 1969, at 
108; id., 1970, at ll7, 195. 
107. F. JAMES, supra note 94, at 53. 
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of trial rulings are not exceptional and when such frequent inter-
ruptions are permitted, the results are not impressive. Hearings are 
not expedited; irreparable harm is not necessarily avoided; and uni-
formity of hearing practices is not ensured. However, when hearing 
examiners are granted authority to rule on all interlocutory questions 
and to control the general availability of interlocutory review, hear-
ings are expedited and fairness is usually preserved. Occasional ex-
ceptions exist, of course. The NLRB's informal yet freely available 
interlocutory review is a prime example of a successful deviation 
from this model.108 Application of the NLRB's approach to other 
agencies seems unlikely because of its dependence on an exceptionally 
experienced and able solicitor, delegation of decision authority by 
proxy to the members' staffs, relatively simple cases, and the pressure 
of time. Hence, unless an agency's hearing structure and personnel 
present circumstances comparable to those of the NLRB, the formal-
ized procedures of other agencies are likely to be a better guide. As 
our recommendations illustrate, we think there are features in almost 
every agency's rules worth emulating. On the other hand, the rules 
of no one agency embody all our recommendations. . 
I£ the past is prologue, the central features of an agency's inter-
locutory appeal practice should incorporate two principles: broad 
delegation of authority to the presiding officer to decide initially all 
interlocutory questions and final authority in the presiding officer, 
except in extraordinary cases, to control whether interlocutory ap-
peal shall be available. Exceptions to these principles should be 
narrowly identified in the rules. Also important is agency adoption 
of a general practice of not postponing the hearing pending review, 
of deciding the appeal on the record made before the examiner, and, 
when authorized, of delegating authority to its staff to confirm the 
examiner's ruling. Our recommendations seek to implement these 
conclusions. 
Several additional suggestions should also be considered.10° First, 
there is little reason for an agency to follow a different interlocutory 
procedure because of the subject of the appeal. Different techniques 
within one agency can seldom be justified. The uses by the FTC of 
108. See pt. II. B. 6. supra. The FCC's record shows that only limited restraints on 
interlocutory appeals may be applied by other means. Its recent move allowing hearing 
examiners to control most interlocutory appeals suggests, however, that this alternative 
is unnecessarily costly. 
109. They did not warrant inclusion in the official recommendations of the Ad· 
ministrative Conference, however. 
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a two-step process for most appeals and a one-step procedure for 
others110 ( especially when the practice is to treat them identically) 
cannot be rationally justified. Confusion without any corresponding 
benefit is the result. Moreover, special procedures are usually buried 
within the practice rule relating to the subject of the appeal rather 
than included in other interlocutory appeal rules. Sound manage-
ment suggests that an agency separate its appellate rules, whether 
interlocutory or final, from other practice rules, and that one section 
contain all rules governing appeal procedures.111 
Second, many agencies do not maintain adequate records of inter-
locutory appeals. For example, the ICC simply has no knowledge of 
how many interlocutory appeals are sought or decided annually, and, 
consequently, no knowledge of whether interim review constitutes a 
serious or immaterial interference in a substantial number of its 
hearings. Likewise, it does not have any information on what sub-
jects, if any, are the current sore spots causing most of the interme-
diate appeals. If administrative procedures are to remain abreast 
of continuing developments, some mechanism needs to be developed 
for determining where the problems are and what they cost. To 
date, recordkeeping is the only viable solution.112 It is not suggested 
that agencies establish massive record retention or information re-
trieval systems solely for measuring the impact of interlocutory re-
view. Where these systems do exist, they should include information 
on interlocutory appeals. Otherwise, a simple index of all interloc-
utory appeals, cross-referenced by subject matter, case title, and 
docket number, should prove adequate. If possible, other informa-
tion should also be recorded. For instance, obtaining data for this 
study would have been relatively simple if agencies had maintained 
110. See text accompanying notes 62-73 supra. 
111. The Conference is not totally blameless in this connection. Its summary 
decision and discovery recommendations suggest three separate tests. Recommenda-
tion 20 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Summary Dedsion in 
Agency Adjudication § 5, in An. CoNF. 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 42 (1971); Recommenda-
tion 21 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Discovery in Ad-
ministrative Adjudication ,i,i 2(6), 7(b), in id. at 44. This inconsistency was pointed 
out to the Conference but to no effect. Proceedings of the Administrative Conference of 
the United States, Fourth Plenary Session 89 (June 2, 1970). See also Gellhorn &: 
Robinson, Summary Judgment in Administrative Adjudication, 84 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 612, 
629 n.88 (1971). 
112. Senator Edward V. Long, one of the authors of the act establishing the 
Administrative Conference, did suggest an "ombudsman" role for the Conference, but 
this suggestion has not been implemented. Long, Public Defender, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 
1966, § 7, at 54 (Book Review). In any case, it would be a costly alternative when 
agencies could monitor their own procedures. 
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records showing what delay or time-saving resulted from the interim 
appeal, which party sought the appeal, and whether the examiner's 
interlocutory ruling was affirmed. This suggestion is consistent with 
(and arguably required by) amended section 3 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act,113 and probably would be unnecessary if agencies 
complied with another recommendation of the Administrative Con-
ference.114 
Finally, these records should be used by agencies to monitor their 
procedures. Periodic self-analysis by the agency, if possible with the 
assistance of interested and informed outsiders, is probably the only 
way an agency can be certain that its rules of practice respond to 
current needs.115 Many agencies have already taken this tack.110 
The Administrative Conference of the United States made the 
following recommendation at its Fifth Plenary Session: 
Recommendation: Interlocutory Appeal Procedures 
Interlocutory appeal procedures for agency review of rulings 
by presiding officers must balance the advantages derived from im-
mediate correction of an erroneous ruling against interruption of 
the hearing process and other costs of piecemeal review. Striking an 
appropriate balance 9etween these competing concerns requires that 
the exercise of discretion in individual cases be carefully circum-
scribed. Procedures that delegate the responsibility for allowing in-
terlocutory appeals to presiding officers, with a reserved power in the 
agency to handle exceptional situations, have proven most satis-
factory. 
RECOMMENDATION117 
Each agency which handles a substantial volume of cases that 
113. Each agency also shall maintain and make available for public inspection and 
copying a cu1Tent index providing identifying information for the public as to any 
matter issued, adopted, or promulgated after July 4, 1967, and required by this para-
graph to be made available or published. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
114. Recommendation 14 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 
Compilation of Statistics on Administrative Proceedings by Federal Departments and 
Agencies, in An. CONF. 1969 ANNUAL REPORT 43.44 (1970), 
115. See Recommendation 14, supra note 114, § 5, at 44. 
116. See FTC Advisory Council on Rules of Practice, 36 Fed. Reg. 4728 (March 11, 
1971). 
117. An. CoNF. 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 50-51 (1971). This recommendation supersedes 
§ 5 of Recommendation 20 and 1111 2(6) and 7(b) of Recommendation 21, adopted June 
2-3, 1970, insofar as they deal with interlocutory appeals. See note 111 supra and 
accompanying text. 
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are decided on the basis of a record should adopt interlocutory ap-
peal procedures based on the following principles: 
I. Presiding officers should be authorized to rule initially on 
all questions raised in the proceedings. A ruling by the presiding 
officer, supported by a reasoned statement, usually should precede 
interlocutory review of the question raised. 
2. In general, interlocutory appeal from a ruling of the presid-
ing officer should be allowed only when the presiding officer certifies 
that (a) the ruling involves an important question of law or policy 
concerning which there is substantial ground for difference of 
opinion; and (b) an immediate appeal from the ruling will materially 
advance the ultimate termination of the proceeding or subsequent 
review will be an inadequate remedy. 
3. Allowance of an interlocutory appeal should not stay the 
proceeding unless the presiding officer determines the extraordinary 
circumstances require a postponement. A stay of more than 30 days 
must be approved by the review authority. 
4. If the number of interlocutory appeals in an agency is sub-
stantial, the authority to affirm, modify, or reverse the presiding 
officer's interlocutory ruling should be delegated, to the extent per-
mitted by law, to a review authority designated by the agency. 
5. Unless the review authority orders othenvise in the particu-
lar case, the review authority should decide the interlocutory ap-
peal on the record and briefs or oral argument. The review author-
ity should summarily dismiss an interlocutory appeal whenever it 
determines that the presiding officer's certification was improvidently 
granted or that consideration of the appeal is unnecessary. If the re-
view authority does not specify othenvise within 30 days after the 
certification or allowance of the interlocutory appeal, leave to ap-
peal from the presiding officer's interlocutory ruling should be 
deemed to be denied. 
6. Interlocutory review by petition to the review authority with-
out certification by the presiding officer should be restricted to ex-
ceptional situations in which (a) vital public or private interests 
might othenvise be seriously impaired, and (b) the review authority 
has not had an opportunity to develop standards which the presid-
ing officer can apply in determining whether interlocutory review is 
appropriate. 
The first recommendation, that all interlocutory questions be 
ruled upon first by the presiding officer, is a necessary predicate of 
sound trial management. The examiner must be in control of the 
proceeding assigned to him. It is inconsistent, at best, to deny an 
examiner the authority to rule on interlocutory issues yet, at the 
same time, expect him to direct discovery and expedite the hearing. 
He is in the best position to know the case fully, to appreciate 
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whether the ruling effectively implements the agency's purpose, and 
to ensure that the ruling meets the requirements of fairness and 
expedition at the trial level. This does not mean that only the ex-
aminer can provide such guidance and that, therefore, he should be 
the final authority. On the other hand, it does seem myopic to pass 
interlocutory questions to a higher authority without first obtaining 
the views of the presiding officer. Although agencies generally have 
reserved some questions for their exclusive consideration, we can 
see no justification for denying initial consideration by the examiner 
as long as the case is assigned to him.118 The slight costs of delegation 
of authority to the examiner are the following: (I) the arguments 
the parties would otherwise address to the review authority are made 
to the examiner (but the arguments, briefs, and the examiner's ruling 
are included in the record if the appeal is certified); and (2) requiring 
the examiner's ruling will take additional time. The substantial 
benefits from this recommended procedure are the following: (I) the 
examiner is in a position to develop consistent, informed decisions 
since he is likely to be expert on the procedural questions that domi-
nate interlocutory review;119 (2) the examiner's ruling will avoid 
many appeals and dissuade others; (3) the review authority's time is 
freed for consideration of more significant policy questions; and (4) 
the review authority has the benefit of the examiner's guidance on 
the questions that are appealed. 
The second recommendation-that interlocutory appeals gener-
ally be limited to questions certified to the review authority by the 
examiner-is the core of this proposal. Not surprisingly, hearing 
examiners uniformly urge that they be delegated this authority. 
Their argument is not persuasive, however. In their frank desire to 
emulate the position and prestige of federal district court judges, 
they contend that they must be given commensurate power. If 
reliance is placed upon a principle at the opposite pole of Lord 
Acton's famous dictum,120 it is undoubtedly true that at some point 
the failure to delegate authority to a hearing examiner will impair 
his performance. Where this minimum authority level is remains un-
118. Before the matter is assigned to an examiner, or once the case is no longer 
on the examiner's docket, "interlocutory questions" (e.g., extensions of time for filing 
appeal briefs) should be addressed to the review authority. 
119. It is not uncommon for an agency to be unaware of its prior interlocutory rul-
ings. See, e.g., Gellhom, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal 
Trade Commission: The Hearing, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 401, 429 n.153 (1968). 
120. "Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely," Letter to 
Bishop Mandell Creighton (1887). 
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clear, but authority to control access to intermediate appeals hardly 
appears to be the cut off point.121 In any event, this recommendation 
rests upon another, more persuasive argument. The recommenda-
tion's primary justification is experience. Agencies relying upon their 
examiners to limit access to interlocutory review have, in general, 
suffered fewer hearing interruptions and have benefited from speed-
ier hearings. The examiner is in charge; he controls the scope of 
discovery and the direction of the trial. 
The standard for certification of interlocutory ;rulings by the 
examiner-the focus of the Administrative Conference's second rec-
ommendation-is unexceptional. With two major modifications, it 
hews closely to the judicial standard set forth in section 1292(b).122 
The more restrictive judicial standard of a "controlling question of 
law" is expanded to include important questions of both policy and 
law.123 This change reflects the policy function of an agency hearing 
and suggests that policy questions may deserve interim agency guid-
ance. On the other hand, the basic standard contemplates three types 
of rulings that are also covered by the judicial analogue: (I) those 
which are novel or without precedent and about wh~ch there could 
be a difference of opinion; (2) those which take a position contrary 
to prior agency authority; and (3) those which conform with a prior 
agency position but might now be challenged on a new ground.124 
The other significant alteration we suggest to the judicial standard 
is to authorize immediate review when subsequent consideration by 
the review authority would be an inadequate remedy, even though 
immediate review would not necessarily advance the ultimate termi-
nation of the litigation. This modification is designed to reach im-
portant interlocutory questions that would become moot if immedi-
ate appeal is not available or that otherwise would not constitute 
prejudical error.125 
The third recommendation seeks to assure that, even when 
allowed, interlocutory review will not delay agency hearings. The 
purpose here is to minimize delay. In line with other provisions 
in these recommendations, we suggest that primary authority for 
121. The FCC's successful experience with freely available appeals to its Review 
Board is the most obvious rebuttal case in point. See pt. II. n. 1 supra. 
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964). See text accompanying notes 102-06 supra.· 
123. See text following note 117 supra. 
124. See Note, supra note 102, at 948. 
125. E.g., orders authorizing discovery, disclosing confidential information, denying 
a privilege, or setting the time and place of hearing. 
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staying the proceeding for 30 days should be delegated to the 
presiding officer. If a further extension is warranted, not only the 
examiner's but also the review authority's approval must be ob-
tained.126 This provision eliminates inadvertent delay. Delay will 
occur only when the agency consciously accepts it. A corollary re-
quirement, which all agencies appear to have satisfied (and therefore 
is not included in this recommendation), is that a time limit be 
specified within which the objecting party must file its interlocutory 
appeal from the challenging ruling. 
The fourth recommentation is suggested by the Administrative 
Conference's earlier alternative recommendation that agencies with 
a substantial adjudicative caseload should delegate review authority 
to an employee board.127 The experience of the FCC and SEC sup-
ports this proposal. Its effect is to enhance the examiner's position 
and yet to provide, insofar as structure can, a method for expediting 
most appeals. A review board also insulates the adjudicative process 
from commission interference until the final appeal, and frees the 
commissioners (at least in part) from adjudicative restrictions until 
the case is before them. On balance, we prefer the FCC approach of 
delegating to the Review Board the power both to affirm and to re-
verse the examiner. This approach leaves the agency free of all 
interim adjudicative responsibility. The Review Board is better 
equipped to render consistent, soundly reasoned opinions on the 
technical procedural questions that dominate interlocutory appeals. 
The alternative SEC approach of limiting the employee board 
to affirming the examiner's ruling is satisfactory, however, and is 
logically consistent with the Conference's prior "certiorari" review 
recommendation.128 
126. This requirement limiting the examiner's authority to delay the proceeding is 
not inconsistent with our earlier recommendation increasing the e.xaminer's decisional 
power. Here the restriction is designed to focus the review authority's attention on the 
delay resulting from the interlocutory appeal. Moreover, this requirement dovetails 
with 1J 5 of the recommendation that permission to appeal from the e.xaminer's 
decision is automatically denied after 30 days unless the review authority specifically 
rules otherwise. See text following note 117 supra. 
127. See Recommendation 6 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 
Delegation of Final Decisional Authority Subject to Discretionary Review by the Agency, 
in AD. CoNF. 1969 ANNUAL REPORT 38-39 (1970); Freedman, supra note 4. 
128. See Recommendation 6, supra note 127. See also Recommendation 9 of the 
Administrative Conference of the United States (1961-1962), S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 
1st Sess. 153-63 (1963); Auerbach, Scope of Authority of Federal Administrative Agencies 
To Delegate Decision Making to Hearing Examiners, 48 MINN. L. R.Ev. 823 (1964). For 
another variant, which would delegate authority to affirm to the chief examiner, sec 
Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal Trade Com• 
mission: Pretrial Practices, 36 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 113, 182-83 (1968). 
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The fifth recommendation deals with simple housekeeping rules 
of practice that only a few agencies currently apply.129 Briefly stated, 
it generally requires the parties to make their only argument to the 
examiner-and to stand by that argument-and imposes a time limit 
on interlocutory interruptions. It sacrifices a party's opportunity to 
respond to the examiner's ruling; however, the impact of this pro-
posal can cut in both directions, since it likewise prevents the ap-
pellee from shoring up an examiner's erroneous justification. The 
time saved by this procedure, in addition to the fact that each party 
has an opportunity during review of the examiner's initial decision 
to challenge the interlocutory ruling, further justifies this approach. 
Finally, this recommendation incorporates the double-discretion stan-
dard governing interlocutory appeals in the federal courts. Under 
this approach, an interlocutory appeal is subject to the discretion of 
both the presiding officer and the review authority; either can deny 
or grant permission to appeal, except that the review authority, of 
course, has the final word. 
Since power needs restraint, the sixth recommendation incorpo-
rates a safety-valve procedure by allowing the review authority, in 
exceptional circumstances, to accept interlocutory appeals that an 
examiner refuses to certify. In implementing this recommendation, 
each agency should carefully spell out these categorical exceptions. 
Otherwise, they can become the exceptions that destroy this proposal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
If adopted, these recommendations will alter the relationship 
between some agencies and their hearing examiners. The Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA) seeks to assure that an examiner is in-
dependent, that his initial decision will be based on the facts in the 
record, and that the hearing-at least if required to be decided on the 
record-will maintain the basic fairness markings of a judicial trial. 
The AP A's structural protections are unnecessarily burdensome, 
however, unless the examiner is in complete charge of the proceeding 
assigned to him. If the agency may freely interrupt and review every 
move he makes, the statutory mandate is duplicative. Unrestricted 
interlocutory review creates a dual system of hearings, with little 
independence or discretion left to the hearing officer. If, on the other 
hand, interlocutory review is sensitively restrained, the trial exam-
129. This proposal is patterned, in part, after two CAB and FPC rules. 14 C.F.R. 
§ 302.18(£) (1971); 18 C.F.R. § l.28(a) (1971). 
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iner can shape and determine the conduct of the proceeding without 
impairing the fairness of the hearing. That, in essence, is the object 
of this proposal. 
